INTRODUCTION
THE title of my Address, Moral Responsibility and the Law, will immediately cause discomfort in the minds of those psychiatrists who believe that a psychiatrist should be so detached from a philosophy of values and from moral considerations of all kinds as to be able to practise his art and science in a kind of moral vacuum. Nevertheless, it has always been my contention that no doctor (whether he practises psychological medicine or any other branch) can afford to adopt a position of such artificial isolation without running the risk of losing touch with reality.
Furthermore, a physician, in spite of certain social privileges, such as exemption from serving on a jury, to which he has attained over the centuries, remains an ordinary citizen and has the right and the duty to contribute the weight of his professional experience towards the solution of problems affecting the commonweal. It is for that reason that the various Royal Commissions which have considered capital punishment have always seen fit to take evidence from representative medical men and women, acting as individuals or as delegates of professional associations. For example, the last Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, under the Chairmanship of Sir Ernest Gowers, accepted memoranda both from the British Medical Association and from the Royal Medico-Psychological Association and heard the evidence of their deputed witnesses. It is the psychiatrist, perhaps, who is more concerned with medico-legal problems when it comes to capital offences than any other doctor. The Prison Medical Officer, who invariably gives evidence in murder trials, need not have had any special training4n general psychiatry; but it often happens that his evidence is more to the point and more acceptable to the judge and jury than that given by the specialist in psychological medicine.
My approach will be largely historical and philosophical. I shall support one main thesis only: the durability and value of any civilization or organized culture-pattern depend on the moral basis of the system of Common Law which has been established. In other words, a system of law that is not firmly rooted in a sound morality gives rise to features which will eventually cause a society to crumble. Our civilization, for instance, endures because the law is so greatly respected; and the law is respected in virtue of its conformity with the Moral Law. However, the public conscienc' , anyhow for the past century, has been particularly delicate and sensitive so far as capital punish ent is concerned; and many thoughtful and responsible citizens have come to believe that the M'N ghten Rules, as at present formulated, to a certain extent undermine the moral basis of the Common Law.
It is because I believe that the slight modification of these rules, with the addition of an extra "limb", as recommended by the C6uncil of the B.M.A. in its memorandum to the Royal Commission, would serve to bring things up to date and satisfy our social conscience, that I would support those changes.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Although in England there was,some kind of conception of man being free and responsible before the middle of the thirteenth centur$', it was, so far as one can tell, poorly reflected in the administration ofjustice; and, in practice, the relktionship between the common man and his overlord was very much a slave-master relationship.
It was perhaps not until 1258, when Henry of Bracton wrote the first legal textbook that the Common Law of England came to be firmly based on the moral idea. This remarkable man was a priest, a Chancellor of Exeter Cathedral and a Judge. His textbook was entitled "De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Anglie". His notion of guilt has its roots in moral theology, with its insistence on mens rea (the intentionally guilty mind) as the criterion. He stated that Rex est sub deo et sub le#e (the King is subject to God and to the Law); and all his legal formulations were based on the idea of liber et legalis homo (free and -responsible man). He also wrote: de omni homine prwsumiter quod sit bonus homo donec probatur in contrarium (it is the right of every man to be considered a good man unless it can be proved to the contrary).
An analysis of Bracton's sources shows that they included Greek and Roman texts, the Hebrew Old Testament, the New Testament, Saint Augustine and both early and contemporary Canonists, amongst whom was Saint Raymond of Penafort, who was the Dominican Master General. This cleric insisted on a distinction being drawn between actio humana (the act of a responsible, integrated human being) and actuts hominis (the deliberation as such, regarded independently of the agent); this concept is, of course, directly referable to the rudimentary psychology of " self-examination". Chief Justice Fortescue in the fifteenth century wrote two important treatises in the same tradition:
"De Laudibus Legum Anglime", and "De Monarchia". He derived many of his ideas from Aristotle, St. Augustine Ind St. Thomas Aquinas. , Christopher St. Jermyn in the sixteenth century published his "Law and Equity", in the form of a dialogue between a doctor of theology and a student of law. He was in close touch with Chancellor Gerson of Paris UJniversity; and his approach was again that of the Catholic Humanist. Sir Thomas More, one of'England's greatest Lord Chancellors, was, of course, exactly in the same tradition-Aristotelian and Thomist. Although the Catholic-Humanist tradition was broken from the sixteenth century onwards, the library of Sir Edward Cooke, a Protestant, was stacked with books of divinity, including the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine; and he stated categorically that the Law of England is based upon the Law of God.
It is interesting to note that as late as 1579 one in three of the practitioners of Law in the Temple were known Papists. Thus, from the Reformation onwards we have the paradox of the old Christian, as opposed to the secular, tradition being carried on by lawyers-Protestant as well as Catholic-rather than by the Clergy.
In other words, it would seem, then, that the collective conscience of the British people has been forned and informed by Christian Ethics and that, over the centuries, we have come to owe our conception of justice to the Common Law rather than to more narrowly religious formulations.
It was perhaps Thomas Hobbes, the first great secularist, who in the seventeenth century began to throw doubt on the moral basis of law. You will remember his dictum that "the life of man in his natural coidition is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short". Hobbes and his sympathizers concluded as a natural corollary that the natural man must be coerced.
It is not too fanciful, I think, to regard this line of thought as providing the foundation stone of the totalitarian states of our own era. In parenthesis, I might say that the pessimism of Hobbes' aphorism can only be equalled by that of the late Dr. David Eder: "We are born mad. We acquire morality, and become stupid and unhappy. Then we die." It is interesting to note that Hobbes' chief opponents were lawyers, such as Lord Clarendon and Sir Matthew Hale; and Sir Henry Finch in 1687 in his "Description of the Common Law in England" maintained that the principles governing the law are to be derived from all the sciences, legal and "foreign", i.e. non-legal. He described these sources in the following words "out of the best and very bowels of Divinity, Grammar, Logic, also from Philosophy, natural, political, economical, moral, though in our Reports and Year Books they come not under the same terms, yet the things which you find there are the same; for the sparks of all the sciences in the world are raked up in the ashes of the law".
In the words of Holdsworth: "The general rule of the common law is that crime cannot be imputed to a man without mens rea. It is, of course, quite another question how the existence of that mens rea is to be established. The thought of man is not triable by direct evidence; but if the law grounds liability upon intent it must endeavour to try it by circumstantial evidence. Much of that circumstantial evidence will be directed to show that a man of ordinary ability, situated as the accused was situated, and having his means of knowledge, could not have acted as he acted without having that mens rea which it is sought to impute to him. In other words, we must adopt an external standard in adjudicating upon the weight of the evidence adduced to prove or disprove mens rea. That, of course, does not mean that the law bases criminal liability upon non-compliance with an external standard. So to argue is to confuse the evidence for a proposition proved by that evidence."
In so far as this Address can ultimately be limited to a consideration of the desirability of retaining the M'Naghten Rules as at present formulated, in the light of modern mental science, the question resolves itself as follows: do the M'Naghten Rules provide a sound criterion for the establishment of mens rea (the intentionally guilty mind), especially in capital offences? PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND AND THE NATURE OF LAW However, before I do this, I should like to outline the philosophical background against which I have tried to review the problems suggested by the title of my Address, "Moral Responsibility and the Law". The position that I am assuming is, roughly speaking, Thomist and may be considered as taking up a midway stand in between idealist, ethical formalism and stoicism on the one hand and mere utilitarianism on the other.
According to such a viewpoint, social morality may be said to lie between the extremes of anarchism and collectivism. In this context, anarchism is meant to imply such an insistence on the dignity of the individual that group-values may in certain circumstances be defied. Collectivism assumes exactly the opposite, i.e. that the individual is to be regarded merely as a unity who possesses significance only in relation to the mass.
Let me briefly consider the concept of law before more closely examining some of the philosophical implications of moral responsibility.
Law is an analogical term, with varying, though related, meanings for the moralist, the lawyer and the natural scientist, whether the last-mentioned be a physicist or a physician. For the moralist, the law is significant on four main counts: (1) as an ordinance of reason which is (2) issued by the competent authority (3) for the sake of the common good and (4) promulgated to those who should obey it.
It is to be noticed that four important elements stand out in this definition: (i) law is not a dictate of power, although the ability to enforce it is assumed, but rather a statement charged with intelligence.
(ii) Law is not just a personal precept, deriving from some private authority or other, such as one's father, spiritual director or psychiatrist. (iii) Its direct purpose is a "whole happiness" which must (iv) make sense in the minds of those who are subjected to it.
This moral-theological notion of the law is based on the conviction that the world is governed by intelligence, and that we are all sufficiently akin for general statements to be made about us. In other words, the notion breaks down if it is assumed that we all stand on our own merits and that every individual is to be regarded as a special case.
If my short historical survey of the origins of our Common Law be substantially correct, it will be seen that experts in both Common and Canon Law have over the centuries accepted a definition of law such as I have just given. In other words, they have been content implicitly to build on foundations which depend on the moral idea, although the lawyers themselves seldom make explicit reference to morality as such. In fact, they, like doctors or any other specialists, can be very suspicious of moral dicta-and rightly and properly so in certain circumstances.
Nevertheless, a lawyer, who reflectively harks back to his premises, finds himself, willy-nilly, engaging in philosophical speculations. He will ask himself, for instance, whether there is such a thing as a Natural Law, a &SK?77, antecedent to his own discipline. Of recent years, it must be admitted, legal philosophers were apt to reject theories which assumed the existence of a Natural Law. However, the belief that the Natural Law exists in a very real sense and gives substance to civilized codes is again coming into favour, and has, as indicated earlier in my Address, always been nobly defended by great lawyers, implicitly assumed in the Common Law of England and applied by the most able judges. Law for the natural scientist may be a quasi-mathematical statement, expressing a statistical relationship or co-ordinating explanatory hypotheses; or it may represent a semi-poetical exposition of Nature's august impersonality. However, since it is not applicable to human behaviour-patterns exclusively, we may leave it on one side. The psychiatrist, in view of the nature of his work, must of necessity accept the notions of law which are shared by the moralist and the lawyer: the moralist, because of his concern with what a person ought to do in order to be happy; the lawyer, because his main interest is in the field of the individual's smooth adjustment to his social environment.
At this stage, it would be useful, I think, to recapitulate this philosophical position in more formal language. It is a position which depends on dogmatic theology, it is true; but it is one which is as well worth stating as that assumed by exponents of the entirely secular state.
Above, behind and interwoven with every law, the Eternal Law, the Lex £terna, which exists in the mind of God, is to be discerned. This is the Logos, the Verbum, which is identified by the Christian theologian with the Second Person of the Trinity, who is thought of as the exemplar, the first agent and the purpose of every statement that makes sense. As a derivative therefrom, in the mind of every rational creature without the interposition of human authority, we have the Natural Law, the Lex Naturalis. The word "natural" is not used here in contrast to "supernatural", but rather in the sense of the obverse of "artificial". The Natural Law represents a body of rules which should in theory be self-evident, although in practice they are often not so.
In so far as some of these rules are in the nature of primary principles, they are fairly evident. Others are more like conclusions, which are debatable. For example, it is more obvious that a husband should cherish his wife than that he should cherish only one at a time.
The theologian would claim that the Natural Law includes an obligation to serve the community, which raises the question of what exactly society demands of the citizen. The community does not make a simple statement that he should observe the Natural Law, but proceeds to try to settle (and, in a sense, somewhat arbitrarily) points which are at the time considered necessary for the maintenance of respect for the Natural Law and, perhaps more conspicuously, essential for the preservation of public peace and safety. At this point we encounter what the Thomist philosophers call the Positive Law or Lex Humana.
The regulations which come under the Positive Law originate in the Eternal Law, but the dialectical process is different from that of the Natural Law. For, whereas the precepts of the Natural Law can in a sense be deduced from their premises (for example, one can infer that monogamy provides the best way of promoting a happy and stable man-woman relationship), those of the Positive Law are, as it were, constructed and imposed, and derived from an act of legislative will. Alternative courses may be open, but the competent authority has to decide on one or the other for the sake of uniformity; and the decision, provided that it does not contravene the Natural Law, is held to be just and binding.
It is to be noted that the concept of the Natural Law is rather a woolly one unless it is seen against a background of dogmatic theology, when it becomes crystal-clear; but, for that very reason, the notion may be repellent to a modern audience. Let me repeat again, however, that the position must be stated in view of the fact that the The chief test of the differences between the Natural Law and the Positive Law is as follows: in the case of the former, certain acts are considered good and therefore commanded; others are considered bad and hence forbidden. In the case of the Positive Law, the position is reversed: certain acts are commanded and therefore considered good; others are forbidden and therefore regarded as bad.
The distinction is not to be thought of as a division of watertight compartments, although some theorists on both sides have treated it as such. 'Thus, there are moralists who regard natural and religious precepts as being the only really binding laws, and the demands of the Civil Law as merely penal. Thus, if you infringe the Customs regulations and are found out, you have to pay the price, and cheerfully. Representing the other point of view, there are secular lawyers who state that moral and religious condemnations are just private considerations, which may or may not be respected by the sovereign civil authority. I have no wish to enlarge upon this, but it does give a hint of the conceptual difference between Sin on the one hand and Crime on the other, thereby providing a useful safeguard.
Every deviation from the law, i.e. the right course of action, was originally termed sin, peccatum; but, with the development of complex, organized juridical communities (of Church and State) it came to be recognized that there were times when it was one thing to disobey the moral law and another to attract the attention of the police.
It was further realized that it was no part of the duty of the State school-marmishly to legislate for every twist and turn of the Natural Law, and that it would be intolerable if it tried to make every sin into a crime. Conversely, with due regard for the duty of obeying our superiors, there is a defensible humour in the religious hesitation to treat every crinme as a sin.
The Natural Law, then, tends to be more interior, subtle and non-compulsive than the Positive Law, which is more exterior to the self and, in a sense, stiffer and more minatory. The theologian would claim that God alone can search the heart of man and judge culpability with any certainty. Human judges have to be guided by the Positive Law; and, though a just system of law will take motives into account, its enquiry will stop short of imputing sin in a theological sense. That is one of the reasons why I personally find moral homilies and condemnations from the Bench so out of place and distasteful. MORAL RESPONSIBILTrY I shall consider very briefly the question of Moral Responsibility against the same kind of background. Responsibility means different things to the theologian and to the lawyer; and I should imagine that the psychiatrist finds himself occupying a rather uncomfortable position in between the two.
The theologian has two roles to fill: that of the theorist and that of the practitioner. As a theorist, he teaches moral theology; as a practitioner, he administers the Sacrament of Penance and acts as a spiritual director. According to theology, grave sin represents a failure to enact a good which it was realized was greatly worth doing, and which in the circumstances positively required to be done, with the presupposition that it was known to be a failure and that the failure was deliberate; or, expressed in slightly different language, full consent and deliberation were involved. The act may be wrong in itself, but the guilt lessens in proportion to the ignorance and lack of deliberation. It is interesting to note that these categories are exactly reflected in the M'Naghten Rules.
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However, when it comes to dealing in practice with the penitent, in other words, when the confessor acts as judge, he is at once more cautious and more slap-dash-more cautious, because he knows that God is the sole judge of consent and deliberation; more slap-dash, because God is not a criminal investigator and does not demand a close analysis.
The Civil Law, because it is more wooden, has to be more circumspect. It may be trying a man for his life. According to the law, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the crime has been committed, that the law was known or should have been known to the accused, and that the act was done deliberately with consciousness of its illegality. Clearly, the M'Naghten Rules are an echo of theology; and a theologian may well feel that it would be difficult to improve them substantially. May I remind you of the M'Naghten Rules as at present formulated: according to the M'Naghten Rules, to establish a defence on the ground of insanity in a criminal case, "it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he-was doing what was wrong".
The psychiatrist is in a less happy position, and for the following reasons: (i) his main concern is to cure his patient rather than to "liquidate" him. (ii) If he has any humility at all, he has less confidence in his m6tier than the theologian has in his. (iii) He is not in a position confidently to leave his patient to God's Providence. (iv) As he is not directly a servant of the State, he rightly feels that his main concern is with the welfare of his patient and that he can leave it to other people to look after the interests of society. For these reasons and many more, unless he takes very great care, the evidence given in Court by an independent psychiatrist, acting as an expert witness, may easily be biased, muddled and irrelevant. In fact, many lawyers delight in bringing all these charges against the psychiatrist. Nevertheless, it would be universally agreed that the lawyer, the theologian and the psychiatrist must take the important principle of Equity into account. Equity acts in favour of the spirit of the law as against its letter; and if it can be shown that in many instances the M'Naghten Rules operate in opposition to equity, a strong case can be made for their revision.
If it can be further demonstrated that, in the light of modern knowledge, the M'Naghten Rules in their present formulation violate the letter as well as the spirit of the law, the case for their revision becomes even stronger; and it is my belief that the Rules are an offence both in Law and in Equity.
It is interesting to note that Sir Walter Moberly in his Riddell Memorial Lectures on "Responsibility", relying almost exclusively on non-Catholic sources and authorities came to very nearly the same conclusions on the question of moral responsibility vis-a-vis the law as I have done.
It will be remembered from my little historical survey of the problem that it is an inalienable principle of Common Law that a man can be found guilty of the offence with which he is charged and punished accordingly only if mens rea (the intentionally guilty mind) can be established in accordance with the currently acceptable rules of evidence. It is clearly impossible to establish mens rea in the case of an insane person, for an insane person is held in law to be irresponsible. That is one of the reasons why amongst the recommendations put forward by the B.M.A. there was one to the effect that the wording of the verdict, "guilty, but insane" be changed. The memotandum suggested that the wording should be amended to read roughly as follows: "the accused did the act (or made the omission) with which he is charged, but is not guilty on the ground that he was insane, so as not to be responsible at the time, according to law". Let me again insist that the concept of guilt is valueless unless it presupposes moral responsibility in the guilty person; and a person judged to be insane in respect of a certain act is irresponsible and hence cannot possibly incur guilt. The problem can therefore be reduced to the following question: do the M'Naghten Rules serve as the best possible instrument for the establishment ofinsanity in open Court, or can they be improved?
Before I summarize the arguments in favour of the revision of the M'Naghten Rules and the recommendations of the B.M.A. given in evidence before the Royal Commission, I should like to put another rhetorical question and provide an answer expressed in psychological language: what is all the fuss about, seeing that, on an average, not more than a dozen people are hanged in the course of a year in Great Britain?
THE "COLLECTIVE SUPER-EGO" In my opinion, it is legitimate (by analogy, be it noted) to make use of a concept which may be termed the "Collective Super-Ego" which is to be regarded as the unconscious counterpart of the social (or collective) conscience.
In the case of the individual patient, we know from our psychiatric experience that tensions which are dangerous for mental health develop when there is too great a discrepancy between the unconscious conscience (the super-ego of the Freudian schema) and the more "adult" moiety of the conscience which is informed by the intellect. We know, for instance, that discrepancies of that kind may contribute oetiologically to obsessive-compulsive neurosis, to psychogenic anxiety-states, depressive syndromes and paranoid reaction-formations.
It seems to me that the same principles apply to the social collectivity. Jung realized this although he employed different concepts and made use of a different terminology to express it.
In Nazi Germany the laws of the Reich were altered overnight in such a way as to satisfy the most disreputable demands of the instincts (in favour of the Id, as the psychoanalysts would put it), with the result that an unbridged gulf developed between the social conscience and the Collective Super-Ego, which inevitably remained unchanged and which was still largely a compound of Christian ethics.
We know what followed: deliria, unbridled aggression, savagery, panic, mass paranoia and finally despair.
In other totalitarian regimes the social conscience sanctions the "liquidation" of political opponents on the grounds that they are "enemies of the State" and have thereby forfeited their right to live. We do not know, even after thirty-five years, whether the Collective Super-Ego of these peoples has caught up on the social conscience and finally dragged it away from its roots in the soil of the Natural Law. There is much to suggest that it has not. In England to-day it is common for even kindly and educated people to say, for example: "What is the use of keeping creatures like Straffen alive? Monsters, such as Haigh or Heath, even if some sentimental and woolly-headed psychiatrists may care to regard them as insane, are better dead; if kept alive, they are only a burden on the State and a misery to themselves". ,Or again: "Idiots and imbeciles should be painlessly put to death at birth or shortly afterwards". We have our distinguished and enlightened supporters of euthanasia, "mercy-killing" (so-called) and sterilization for eugenic or other social coi:siderations. In Denmark, a highly civilized, but entirely secular, State, the law permits of the "voluntary" castration of psychosexual deviants.
It may be thought that in England we are still a long way from the Nazi practice of emptying the mental hospitals and institutions for mental defectives by transferring their occupants to the gas chambers; but, in my opinion, the dividing line is a thin one. In those days in Germany a psychiatrist who signed a certificate of lunacy or mental defect knew full well that he was likely to be signing a death warrant. I have since spoken to colleagues in Germany who had broken down under the strain.
The general public in Great Britain-anyhow its more sensitive and educated members-has come to realize obscurely that, in the light of modern mental science, the M'Naghten Rules do not necessarily establish moral irresponsibility, which is the only aspect of insanity with which the Law need concern itself in this connexion. That fact is for me a sure sign that there is a cleavage between the conscious elements of the changing social conscience and those largely unconscious components which I have called the Collective Super-Ego; and I believe that the situation which has been allowed to develop is dangerous from the point of view of mental hygiene.
ARGUMENTS FOR REVISION OF THE M'NAGHTEN RULES
The Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, No. 14 on February 3, 1950, outline the chief arguments raised in favour of a revision of the M'Naghten Rules. The Rules, it will be remembered, equate disease of the mind with a defect of reason. When these rules were formulated a hundred years ago, a man was regarded as a kind of reasoning machine; in other words, the psychology of those times took note of the intellect only and remained unaware of any of the principles governing man's emotional life in health and disease. Insanity, therefore, of necessity involved a "defect of reason".
To-day we know, however, that many forms of insanity-in fact, most kinds-do not primarily impair the intellect so much as disorganize the life of the emotions, and in such a way as to deprive a man of his capacity for moral choice, or anyhow seriously to distort his perceptions of right and wrong.
This extended concept of insanity should, therefore, in the light of modern, well-established mental science, be recognized in Common Law, as it is in clinical psychiatry.
For example, I can readily recall the case of a young murderer who could and should on many occasions, in appropriate circumstances, have been certified as of unsound mind. The M'Naghten Rules in their present form made it impossible for his counsel successfully to establish a verdict of "guilty but insane"; nor, after the usual statutory enquiry, was the prerogative of mercy invoked in this case. Examples of abnormal mental states which fail, in very many instances, to be covered by the M'Naghten Rules, if the rules be strictly interpreted, include: aggressive psychopathic states; states of mind associated with organic damage to, or disordered physiological functioning of, the brain; melancholia in one or other of its many forms; early schizophrenia (or dementia prncox, as it is sometimes called); and delusional insanity.
Another very important argument in favour of the revision of the M'Naghten Rules is the fact that the various judges interpret them in accordance with their own assessment of the individual case, which may be good in equity but is bad in law. Until Lord Chief Justice Reading ruled that the word "6wrong" was to be interpreted as meaning "against the law", a wider interpretation was permissible. However, humane judges even now see fit on occasions to disregard Lord Reading's ruling. The following is a case in point:
A young man was recently put on trial for strangling his sister. He had promised his mother on her death-bed that he would look after his sister after her death. This man was, in my opinion, suffering from the depressive form of schizophrenia, which I called "Melancholia" in order not to fog the judge and jury unnecessarily. He had the delusion that his father was likely to die very shortly and that he himself had not got long to live. It seemed to him, therefore, that there would be no one left to look after his sister and that it was his moral duty to kill her. Throughout he was fully aware of the nature and quality of his act and knew that it was against the law and punishable by death. Nevertheless, he was convinced that his act was not only morally justifiable but inevitable; in fact, he told me that in the same circumstances he would do the same thing over again; nor did he wish to escape the consequences by pleading insanity. The judge, in his summing up, directed the jury to return a verdict of "guilty but insane", which they did without leaving the box.
Another judge who might have regarded Lord Reading's ruling as binding would rightly and properly have directed the jury otherwise. The chances are that, after a statutory enquiry, the prerogative of mercy would have been invoked, but not before the death sentence had been pronounced in open Court with all the awful solemnity and ceremonial that accompany these occasions.
Up till now, the M'Naghten Rules have not been held to cover cases of mental deficiency, however severe. The B.M.A. Memorandum commented on this as follows: "The first question is as to the meaning of 'disease of the mind'. The Select Committee on Capital Punishment which reported in 1930 thought that it was desirable to 'extend the area of criminal irresponsibility in the case of the mentally defective'. It may be that mental disease is commonly understood to include mental defect, but the Association suggests that it should be clearly laid down that 'disease of the mind', as used in the definition of irresponsibility, covers incomplete mental development as well as grave disturbances of mental health."
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
TO THE ROYAL COMMISSION The B.M.A. recommended that the M'Naghten Rules should be amended to read more or less as follows: (A) To establish a defence on the ground of disease of the mind, the party accused must prove that, at the time of committing the act, he was labouring, as a result of disease of the mind, under (1) a defect of reason such that he did not know (a) the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or (if he did know this) (b) that he was doing what was wrong; or
